The research described here involves the relation between fundamental rights and the rule of law. In the end we want to find out what meaning is attributed to 'rule of law' by the European Court of Human Rights. In this article we describe our method to gather the data we need to be able to perform an analysis of the reasoning process by the Court.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of our research is the relation between fundamental rights and the rule of law.
The background of the research relates to the research program of the Paul Scholten Centre for Jurisprudence with a focus on the analysis of the concept 'rule of law' from a multidisciplinary perspective, including normative, analytical and empirical research (Wilde de, 2012) .
We were intrigued by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in the case of REFAH PARTİSİ and others v TURKEY 3 . In this case the Court argued that the largest and governing party in Turkey could be banned to protect the rule of law. In the REFAH case we see that interference on an individual's fundamental right by the State is justified with an appeal on 'rule of law'. This may be a problem because the major principle within the rule of law is the guarantee of fundamental rights.
We want to find out what meaning is attributed to 'rule of law' by the Court when used as an argument to justify interference. We chose to restrict our research to the articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) because these articles guarantee fundamental rights to individuals but these rights may also be subject to limitations.
Our research questions are:
1. is 'rule of law' used as argument in the Court's judgments in articles 8 to 11 ECHR cases?
2. if so, is 'rule of law' used in these arguments to justify interference in these rights?
If these questions result in a set of judgments with 'rule of law' in arguments to justify interference then these judgments are used for further analysis on the basis of the following research questions:
3. what is the reasoning process used by the Court?
4. what is the meaning attributed to 'rule of law' by the Court?
The focus in this article is on the method applied to gather the data (research questions 1 and 2). Before we describe our method we first introduce the subject of fundamental rights and rule of law in relation with the ECHR and the Court as far as it is relevant at this point.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The Court is the instrument for the protection of human rights guaranteed by the ECHR.
Their aim is to protect democracy and the rule of law in Europe. In our research we selected the articles 8 -11 of the ECHR. Article 8 is right to respect for private and family life.
Article 9 is freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Article 10 is freedom of expression and article 11 freedom of assembly and association. The right and freedoms are guaranteed in the first paragraph of the articles. However, these right and freedoms are not absolute, in the second paragraphs of the articles the conditions of possible restrictions on these right and freedoms are described. It is possible for a State to interfere in a fundamental right as guaranteed in the articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR, there is a so called 'Community Exception'.
"… recognition that the rights of the individual may properly be restricted in the interest of our community at large if certain demanding conditions are satisfied." (Bingham, 2010, p.74 Fig. 1 ). When all the four questions have been answered positively the Court will conclude that there is no violation. In the REFAH case article 11 of the ECHR is at stake, being freedom of assembly and association 4 . In the Court's assessment the first question is "is there interference?".
The parties accepted that REFAH's dissolution and the measures which accompanied it amounted to an interference with the applicants' exercise of their right to freedom of association.
(Case of REFAH PARTİSİ and Others v Turkey 13 February 2003, paragraph 50).
So the answer is "Yes there is an interference".
The next question then is "is the interference justified?".
Such an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it was "prescribed by law", pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of that provision and was "necessary in a democratic society" for the achievement of those aims. The Court then explains that "prescribed by law" means in accordance with the law and that it also implicates the accessibility of the provisions in issue and the foreseeability of their effects. The Court argues:
..the written law most relevant to the question whether the interference was "prescribed by law" is the Turkish Constitution there thus resulted a divergence between the Law on the regulation of political parties and the
Constitution
The Turkish Constitution cannot be amended by ordinary legislation and takes precedence over statute law a conflict between the Constitution's provisions and those of ordinary legislation is resolved in the Constitution's favour 4 Article 11 of the ECHR freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State. Consequently the interference was "prescribed by law".
The following question to be answered by the Court is "are the aims legitimate?" The Court argues:
Taking into account the importance of the principle of secularism for the democratic system in Turkey, it considers that REFAH's dissolution pursued several of the legitimate aims listed in Article 11, namely protection of national security and public safety, prevention of disorder or crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Consequently the interference serves a legitimate aim.
The last question that has to be answered by the Court is if the interference is "necessary in a democratic society?". The category 'necessary in a democratic society' also involves the question whether there is 'a pressing social need' for the interference.
the Court finds that the acts and speeches of REFAH's members and leaders cited by the Constitutional Court were imputable to the whole of the party, that those acts and speeches revealed REFAHS's long-term policy of setting up a regime based on sharia within the framework of a plurality of legal systems and that REFAH did not exclude recourse to force in order to implement its policy and keep the system it envisaged in place. In view of the fact that these plans were incompatible with the concept of a "democratic society" and that the real opportunities REFAH had to put them into practice made the danger to democracy more tangible and more immediate, the penalty imposed on the applicants by the Constitutional Court, even in the context of the restricted margin of appreciation left to Contracting States, may reasonably be considered to have met a "pressing social need". The Court's conclusion regarding Article 11 of the ECHR is:
Consequently, following a rigorous review to verify that there were convincing and compelling reasons justifying REFAH's dissolution and the temporary forfeiture of certain political rights imposed on the other applicants, the Court considers that those interferences met a "pressing social need" and were "proportionate to the aims pursued". It follows that REFAH's dissolution may be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 11 § 2.
Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
(Case of REFAH PARTİSİ and Others v Turkey 13 February 2003, paragraph 135).
In the REFAH case the Court uses 'rule of law' as an argument to justify interference in the fundamental right guaranteed in article 11 of the ECHR. The Court refers to 'rule of law' when assessing if the interference is 'necessary in a democratic society'.
We want to know if there are more Court judgments on articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR in which 'rule of law' is used as argument by the Court and, if so, if 'rule of law' is used to justify interference in these rights.
We chose to start with a simple database search in HUDOC 6 . HUDOC is the database of the Court. In this database one can find the official version of an ECHR judgment or decision in an easy and efficient way. In the next paragraph we describe our research method.
DATA ANALYSIS De Mulder was one of the first legal researchers in the Netherlands who wrote about
Jurimetrics, the empirical study of the law using methods and techniques from statistics (De Mulder, 1984) 7 . In that time there were hardly any legal data available in digital format.
Today legislation and judgments, both national and international, are available online for free. These big (legal) data provide chances and opportunities for legal research (see, for example, Winkels, 2015; Leeuw, 2015; Raad voor de Rechtspraak, 2014; De Mulder, van Noortwijk & Combrink-Kuiters, 2010) . Not only to develop new information tools to enhance the search of these data, to create networks of types of legal data so users can find the information they want more easily and can share it and organize it in the way they want, but also to use these data sets for empirical research (see, for instance, Malsch et al., 2015) 8 . Lautenbach, 2012) .
We chose to do a data search in HUDOC, the database of the Court where one can find the official version of an ECHR judgment or decision in an easy and efficient way 9 .
HUDOC
The HUDOC interface is available in English, French, Russian and Turkish. Judgments and other texts are available in one or both of the Court's official languages being English and
French. To be able to answer the questions if 'rule of law' is used as argument in Court judgments in articles 8 to 11 ECHR cases and if 'rule of law' is used to justify interference in these rights, we chose the following way of working.
We first had to select the type of judgments. To narrow our search we used the filters 'Language', 'Importance' and 'Article'.
In the filter 'Importance' we chose Case reports and level 1 judgments because they contain a full analysis and can be searched under all fields.
10 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int
Case reports are judgments, decisions and advisory opinions delivered since 1998 which have been published or selected for publication in the Court's official Reports of Judgments and Decisions. Level 1 (high importance) refers to all judgments, decisions and advisory opinions not included in the Case Reports which make a significant contribution to the development, clarification or modification of its case-law, either generally or in relation to a particular State. We filtered on articles 8 to 11 and decided to narrow the search to the second paragraph of the articles, because that is where the possible interference on the right and freedoms given in the first sections is regulated.
With the text search function we are able to search for a sequence of words within the documents in the relevant collection, in our case the text fragment "rule of law". HUDOC displays the number of hits inside a given document. It is possible to select the option 'Highlight Exact term only' which highlights the exact term we have searched on being "rule of law". The default operator in HUDOC is 'AND' so our field searches are cumulative.
The selection process resulted in a corpus of judgments with references to the text 'rule of law'. The selection is set on the date the HUDOC database was searched being 18 October 2013 (fixed date). The results were recorded in Excel (see Fig. 2 ). Only the set of judgments where 'rule of law' appears in arguments of the Court will be used a further analysis of the reasoning process and an analysis of the meaning that is attributed by the Court to 'rule of law' (research questions 3 and 4).
OUTCOME
On 18 October 2013 there were 39622 judgments in the HUDOC database, the largest number being judgments by the Chamber (37562) and a smaller number of judgments by the Grand Chamber (2060). When using the filter for English there remain 15881 judgments.
Judgments are stored in HUDOC in English as well as in the language of the State involved not being English. This accounts for the halving in the number of judgments.
When using the filter on Case Reports and level 1 judgments there remain 1760 judgments.
Within these 1760 judgments there are 469 judgments relating to articles 8-2 to 11-2. The text search on "rule of law" within the 469 judgments resulted in 141 judgments (see Table 1 1001 Case Reports 759 8-2, 9-2, 10-2, 11-2 469 8-2, 9-2, 10-2, 11-2 "rule of law" 141 When filtering on article number the number of appearance of the articles 8-2 to 11-2 is also indicated (see Table 2 ).
article number of appearance 8-2 ECHR 224 9-2 ECHR 29 10-2 ECHR 195 11-2 ECHR 55 total 503 Table 2 : Number of appearances of articles 8-2, 9-2, 10-2, 11-2.
The difference between the total of 503 articles 8-2 to 11-2 in Table 2 and 469 judgments on 8-2 to 11-2 in Table 1 can be explained by the fact that in 34 judgments more than one article is mentioned.
Of the 141 judgments with 'rule of law' in the text, judgments in which 'rule of law' appears in an argument of the Court are saved in one folder, where judgments in which 'rule of law' appears in another part of the text are saved in a second folder.
Of the 141 judgments there were 94 judgments with 'rule of law' in arguments of the Court and 47 judgments in which 'rule of law' appeared in another part of the text (see Table 3 ). This showed that there are cases in which besides articles 8-2 to 11-2 other ECHR articles are present. In 17 cases 'rule of law' appeared in the argument of the Court in assessing articles 2, 5 or 7 of the ECHR.
'rule of law' in argument Court 'rule of law' in other part of the judgment 94 47 art. 8-2 41 in argument parties in documents art. 9-2 6 25 22 art. 10-2 22 art. 11-2 8 other 17 Table 4 : Number of judgments articles 'rule of law' in 8-2, 9-2, 10-2, 11-2 or other articles.
If we sort these 94 judgments to interference justified and interference not justified we see that in 13 cases the Court assessed that the interference is justified whereas in 82 cases that the interference is not justified. In one case the Court assessed that there was partly a justified interference and partly a not justified interference 14 . We recorded the case both in the column 'rule of law' interference justified as in the column 'rule of law' interference not justified. This accounts for the sum of 95 cases. Of the 13 cases in which the interference is justified a further specification of types of cases can be made. There are 6 cases in which the interference is justified and 'rule of law 'is used as an argument by the Court, however, not as an argument to justify the interference. The interference is justified with another argument and more, the rule of law argument is used in favour of the applicant.
There are two cases in which the interference is justified and 'rule of law' is used as an argument by the Court to justify the interference, however, for articles outside our scope of 8-2 to 11-2 ECHR. In 5 cases the Court assessed that the interference of the State is justified with an appeal on 'rule of law' as argument.
14 The CASE OF SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM, 25 March 1983. "To sum up, the stopping of Mr. Silver's letter no. 7, Mr. Noe's letter no. 10 and Mr. Cooper's letters nos. 28-31 was both "in accordance with the law" and justifiable as "necessary in a democratic society" (see paragraphs 95, 102, 101 and 103 above). These interferences therefore did not constitute a violation of Article 8 (art. 8). The same conclusion applies as regards the delaying of Mr. Noe's letter no. 12 (see paragraphs 95 and 104 above).On the other hand, the stopping of the 57 remaining letters was not "necessary in a democratic society" (see paragraph 99 above); there has therefore been a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) in each case." NB 'rule of law' in category "in accordance with the law". (CASE OF SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM, 25 March 1983, paragraph 105).
Of the 82 cases in which the interference is not justified we see that there are 2 cases in which the interference is not justified and 'rule of law' is used as an argument by the Court, however, not as the argument to decide that the interference is not justified. There is a violation but not for 'rule of law' reasons. Then there are 15 cases in which the interference is not justified and 'rule of law' is used as an argument by the Court to state that the interference is not justified, however, for articles outside our scope of 8-2 to 11-2 ECHR. This leaves 65 cases in which the interference is not justified and 'rule of law' is used as an argument by the Court to state this (see Table 5 ). If we look at the cases in which 'rule of law' is used as an argument to either justify or not justify interference by article we see that in the 5 cases where the interference is justified with the argument 'rule of law' there are two cases on article 8-2, two on article 9-2, none on article 10-2 and one on article 11-2. In the 65 cases where the interference is not justified with the argument 'rule of law' there are 35 cases on article 8-2, two on article 9-2, twenty one on article 10-2 and seven on article 11-2 (see Table 6 ). We found that in all 5 cases where the interference is justified 'rule of law' is used in the category 'necessary in a democratic society'.
We did the same for the 65 cases in which the interference is not justified with 'rule of law' as argument (see Table 8 ). In the 65 cases where the interference is not justified we found 'rule of law' in 39 cases in the category 'in accordance with the law', in one case in the category 'aims that are legitimate' and in 21 cases in the category 'necessary in a democratic society'. There are also 4 cases in which the argument used is more general and does not refer to either one of the categories.
Here we see that in most article 8-2 cases the Court uses 'rule of law' to argue that an interference should be 'in accordance with the law'. Whereas in the majority of article 10-2 cases the Court uses 'rule of law' to argue that an interference should be 'necessary in a democratic society'.
Summarizing the use of 'rule of law' as argument by the Court by category we see that 'rule of law' is used in 39 cases within the category 'in accordance with the law', in 26 cases within the category 'necessary in a democratic society' and only in one case within the category 'aims that are legitimate' (see Table 9 ). We found that 'rule of law' is used as argument in Court judgments in articles 8-2 to 11-2 ECHR cases and we also found that 'rule of law' is used to justify interference in these rights.
In In these 5 cases the Court justified the interference with an appeal on 'necessary in a democratic society'.
CONLUSIONS
The relation between fundamental rights and the rule of law is the subject of our research.
In this article we focused on our method of data gathering.
Our first research question was "is 'rule of law' used as argument in the Court's judgments in articles 8 to 11 ECHR cases?", our second research question was "if so, is 'rule of law' used in these arguments to justify interference in these rights?" Our findings show that indeed the Court refers to 'rule of law' to argue that certain restrictions on human rights are necessary. It shows that in the period 1959 -18 October 2013 'rule of law' is used as argument in Court judgments in articles 8-2 to 11-2 ECHR. It also shows that in 5 cases 'rule of law' is used as argument by the Court to justify interference in these rights. The next step in our research is to answer our questions 3 and 4 being "what is the reasoning process used by the Court?" and "what is the meaning attributed to 'rule of law' by the Court?". We will both look at the reasoning process in the 5 cases in which the interference is justified as well as in the 65 cases in which the interference is not justified (see Appendix). The case of SILVER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM is an intriguing case because it both involves a justified interference and a not justified interference. In analysing the reasoning process we hope to see what meaning is attributed to 'rule of law' by the Court.
To gather our data we used HUDOC, the database of the European Court of Human Rights.
It is relatively easy to use HUDOC to gather data the way we did. However, we also experienced some difficulties. When searching for 'rule of law' as text within article 8-2 to 11-2 ECHR cases HUDOC also provided cases where 'rule of law' is used in articles outside our scope. HUDOC also delivered 4 cases in which there was no explicit reference to articles 8-2 to 11-2 in the text of the judgments. So why did HUDOC come up with these 4 cases? It appeared that in the case details in HUDOC there was a reference to articles 10 and 10-2.
HUDOC is not intended for research generating statistics. For statistics they refer to the Court's annual reports which are published online.
We searched for the explicit text reference 'rule of law', however, it is possible that the Court uses a more implicit reference to 'rule of law' in her argumentation.
We were able to find the explicit references, however, the implicit references are more difficult to find. Implicit references should be operationalized i.e. 'rule of law' is also the reference to x, y and/or z. But then we do not know what meaning is attributed by the Court.
That is why we carry out this study in the first place. We have to find out what meaning is attributed to 'rule of law' by the Court by analysing the reasoning process first.
There is also the problem of the weight of the text 'rule of law' in the argument of the Court.
We do not know yet in what way we may solve this problem.
Our data analysis was performed by hand. This is possible because the amount of cases we found was limited. However, with a larger amount of cases this becomes impossible.
Performing an automatic search and analysis may then be a better way of working. In using data mining methods and techniques to extract patterns and knowledge from these large amount of data we might even discover (new) patterns and dependencies.
All this said and done we do believe that legal databases are rich environments waiting there to be used also already with a more traditional way of working. However, when doing so we want to emphasize the need for an explicit description of the method of data gathering.
